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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CARRIE ANN WALDROP, / 
Petitioner/ Appellee, / 
vs. / Appeal No. 20070066 
WILLIAM FRANK WALDROP, JR, / 
Respondent/Appellant / 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final order on a bifurcated divorce. Jurisdiction lies 
in this court pursuant to U.CA. § 7-2a-3(6). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1, Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding Appellant parent-
time consistent with the schedule the parties had followed for almost three years? 
2, Did the trial court fail to enter sufficient findings to support its parent-
time determination? 
3, Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to credit child 
support overpayments in its division of the marital property? 
1 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the 
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 5 8 A; in granting or 
refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its 
action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, 
to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings 
of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the 
evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the 
court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law 
in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, 
however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all 
motions granted under Rule 12(b), 50(a) and (b), and 59 when the motion is 
based on more than one ground. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-32 (as amended): This statute is reproduced in the 
Addendum to Appellant's Brief. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.4 (as amended): This statute is reproduced in the 
Addendum to Appellant's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties herein filed for divorce on December 15, 2003. R. 001-006. On 
December 22, 2003, the court held a hearing on Appellee/Mother's Motion for 
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Temporary Orders. R. 017. As a result of that hearing, Mother was awarded sole 
custody of the children; Appellant/Father was granted parent time on Tuesday 
evenings and every Friday overnight. R. 018-020. 
On February 14, 2006, the court granted a motion to bifurcate the divorce. 
R. 183-184. The bifurcated decree was entered the same day. R. 188-189. 
The case was tried on October 11, 2006. R. 261-262. The final order was 
entered on December 18, 2006. R. 265-272. Notice of this appeal was filed 
January 12,2007. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on February 18, 1993, and they separated 
approximately ten years later on October 12, 2003. R. 186. The parties had five 
children, who remained with Mother after the separation R. 007-011. Except as 
noted below, the children remained with Mother during the pendency of the action, 
with Father awarded parent time of one evening per week arid every Friday 
overnight. R. 018-020. 
Father was ordered to pay $1,826.00 per month in child support. R. 067-
068. Father was also ordered to pay $919.00 per month as temporary alimony and 
to make the monthly payments on the parties' credit cards. IcL 
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A, Child support overpayment 
In December, 2004, the parties' oldest son John moved in with Father. John 
had turned 18 the previous month, and in June 2005 he graduated from high 
school TR 108; 41. The parties' daughter Elizabeth lived with Father from 
January - November of 2005 and again from December 2005 - January 2006. TR 
108- 109. In January 2006, Elizabeth moved to Arizona and after then resided 
with Father's sister. Id. 
Throughout the action, Father's support obligation was collected by the 
Office of Recovery Services. (Appellant's Exhibit 8 at trial, p. 24 of his 
Addendum.) The obligation was duly modified with John became emancipated, but 
the order was not modified to give credit for the months that John and Elizabeth 
resided with Father. Id. Given these credits, the Office of Recovery collected an 
excess of $10,501.47. Id 
B. Trial court's financial/property division. 
The parties still had significant credit card debt at the time of trial. The 
arrearages were largely due to Father's failure to make the monthly payments he 
had been ordered to pay in the March 2004 hearing. TR 22; 24; 175. Father 
disputed that the arrearages were his fault. TR 147. Because the arrearages were 
so high, the entire sum of equity obtained from selling the parties' home ($17,000) 
had to be applied to credit card debt and the parties' previously incurred attorneys' 
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fees. TR 15-16. The court also had to order Father to liquidate his Thrift Savings 
Plan to pay the credit card debt, with any remaining funds to be divided equally. 
R.271. 
With respect to the personal property, the court made the following 
divisions: 
1. Mother received a 1998 Dodge minivan, valued at $4,000 and subject 
to a $4,000 loan. TR30. 
2. Father received a 2002 Honda Odyssey with a loan owed of either 
$6,989.00 (Mother's testimony) or $8,125.00 (Father's testimony). The van was 
valued at $18,350. TR31;93. 
3. Various items of musical equipment were awarded to Mother, 
although the court did not place a value on these items in its findings. TR 213. 
The court concluded that the credit card arrearages and the personal property 
distribution favored Father. To offset, the court declined to order repayment of any 
of the child support overpayments. TR 214-215. 
C. Parent-time. 
Some months before trial, the parties had attended mediation. At mediation, 
Mother had offered to have the children stay with Father from Thursday overnight 
to Friday one week and on alternating weeks from Thursday evening through 
Sunday evening. TR 62, 64, Obviously, the parties did not settle the case at 
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mediation. At trial, Mother testified that the arrangement proposed at mediation 
was probably not in the children's best interests because Thursday through Sunday 
was too big a block of time considering Father's difficulty maintaining a 
predictable schedule for the children. TR 63. 
The trial court found that while Mother was willing to agree to an expanded 
schedule at one time, clearly she was not willing to agree at the time of trial. TR 
206-207. The court found that where the parties had been following a schedule for 
almost three years, it has obviously been working. Id Therefore, the court 
concluded that Father should be awarded the same parent time that he had enjoyed 
during the pendency of the case. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding parent-time consistent 
with the schedule the parties had used prior to trial. Father is incorrect in asserting 
that the parties had reached an agreement that was disregarded by the court. No 
agreement was reached at mediation, and the trial court found that although Mother 
had been willing to offer additional parent time at one point, she was not willing to 
do so at the time of trial. 
Even if there had been an agreement, the court had the authority to disregard 
any agreement it felt was not in the children's best interests. The court found that 
the previous schedule, which had been used just shy of three years, "worked." It 
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was not an abuse of discretion for the court to conclude that a schedule that had 
been working for the parties and the children for a significant period of time should 
be continued. 
Father's argument that the trial court's findings on this issue are insufficient 
is without merit. Findings need only be specific enough Ihat the parties can discern 
the court's reasoning. Here, the court articulated that its rationale was two-fold: 
(1) the parties had been unable to reach an agreement on their own; and (2) the 
schedule that had previously been used was working for the family. These 
findings are adequate for this Court to determine that the trial court based its 
decision on the children's best interests. 
Father's contention that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to 
award him an offset for overpaid child support similarly fails. In essence, Father is 
challenging the trial court's findings. Father's challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence is fatally deficient because he has not marshaled the evidence supporting 
the finding. Moreover, the trial court's determination that Mother's evidence was 
more credible than Father's will not be disturbed on appeal. 
Giving appropriate deference to the factual findings of the trial court, this 
Court cannot conclude that the trial judge abused his discretion. The trial court 
refused to order repayment because Father's failure to pay the credit cards resulted 
in a larger debt that had to be paid from marital assets. The court found further 
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justification in the fact that Father had received a greater share of personal property 
than Mother. Either reason is adequate to place the trial court's decision soundly 
within the bounds of its discretion. 
Therefore, the trial court's decision should be affirmed, and Mother should 
be awarded her attorney's fees incurred in defending this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING FATHER PARENT TIME CONSISTENT 
WITH THE SCHEDULE THE PARTIES HAD 
PREVIOUSLY FOLLOWED, 
A, The Parties Did Not Reach an Agreement 
Father argues that the parties had an agreement as to parent time and that the 
trial court erred in ignoring the agreement. The first problem with this argument is 
that the trial court found there was no agreement. Specifically, the court concluded 
that while Mother may have offered more parent time at mediation, she was not 
willing to do so at trial. TR 206-207. 
Father ignores this finding and makes no direct challenge to it. Instead, 
Father merely asserts that the trial court "declined to implement the parties' 
agreement created during mediation and thereafter stated by them at trial" 
Appellant's Brief at p. 17. It seems self-evident that had the parties actually 
reached an agreement at mediation, there would have been no trial on the issue of 
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parent-time. The Divorce Mediation Disposition Notice filed with the court 
confirmed that no settlement had been reached. R. 192. 
As Father has pointed to no evidence in the record to establish that there was 
an agreement between the parties, the trial court was clearly correct in its 
conclusion that there was none. 
B. Even if There Were an Agreement, the Court May Disregard It 
Father appears to agree on this point. At page 18 of his Brief, Father cites 
five cases in support of the proposition that a trial court is not required to adhere to 
a stipulation reached by the parties. 
C. The Trial Court's Findings Are Adequate to Establish That The 
Parent-Time Determination Was Based on Best Interests. 
Father's only remaining challenge to the trial court's award of parent-time is 
that the findings of the court were inadequate to demonstrate that the court 
properly considered the children's best interests as required by U.C.A. § 30-3-32. 
The standard against which the court's findings should be measured is that the 
findings must be sufficient so that its reasoning process can be determined. Reid v. 
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989). 
Contrary to Father's position on this issue, the court is not obligated to 
resolve every evidentiary issue, nor is it required to rebut a party's claims point by 
point. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 886 P.2d 
514, 521 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted). 
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"The trial court is not required to recite each indicia of reasoning that leads to its 
conclusions, nor is it required to marshal the evidence in support of them." In re: 
Estate of Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 979 (Utah 1996). Even if the findings are 
not "a model of clarity," as long as the court's reasoning can be divined, the 
findings are adequate. Reid, at 899. 
Here, the court did not go through a point-by-point recitation of what the 
children's best interests would entail and how the current time-sharing 
arrangement met those needs. Rather, the court first cited the fact that the parties 
were unable to agree on a time schedule themselves. In the absence of an 
agreement, the court felt that the schedule that had been followed for almost three 
years should continue in light of the fact that the schedule was "working." TR 207. 
It is important to note that Father does not challenge the trial court's finding 
that the schedule was working. Father does not argue that there were any problems 
with the previous arrangement, nor can he cite to any reason why such an 
arrangement is not in the children's best interests. Instead, Father merely asserts 
that the parties had an agreement (which seems to be a wishful-thinking reference 
to the fact that he could have settled at mediation) and states in a conclusory 
fashion that the findings are inadequate. 
The trial court's findings are to be accorded substantial deference. Watson 
v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1992) (citation omitted). The Rules of Civil 
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Procedure provide that a trial court's findings will be upheld unless they are 
"clearly erroneous." U.R.C.P. 52(a). Father has failed to meet this burden. 
Where the findings are sufficiently detailed that this Court can divine the trial 
court's reasoning, this Court should conclude that they are.legally adequate. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING 
TO ORDER MOTHER TO REPAY FATHER'S CHILD SUPPORT 
OVERPAYMENTS, 
A, Father Failed to Marshal the Evidence. 
Father acknowledges that the trial court explained the reason for its decision 
in its findings. In his brief, Father states: 
The trial court found that the amount of equity in the 2002 Honda Odyssey 
vehicle awarded to Mr. Waldrop coupled with his failure to make all court 
ordered interim payments provided him surplus value beyond the value of 
the marital property awarded to Ms. Waldrop. The court found that this net 
surplus was sufficient to nullify Mr. Waldrop's child support overpayment 
claim. 
Appellant's Brief at pp. 20-21. Father then proceeds to argue that the findings are 
inadequate because they are not supported by the record. 
To successfully attack a factual finding of the district court, "an appellant 
must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding." Wilson Supply, Inc. 
v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, at <|f 21, 54 P.3d 1177. To do this, Father must 
present "every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the 
very finding he resists." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 
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1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis in original). Father must then demonstrate 
that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to Mother. 
State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, at f 14, 989 P.2d 1065. 
Father has utterly failed to marshal the evidence. Instead, Father raises two 
issues he suggests demonstrate that the findings are not supported by the evidence. 
First, he alleges that there was no specific evidence as to the value of certain 
property items that would have enabled the court to make an offset. Father 
certainly had every opportunity at trial to present evidence as to the value of the 
property. It seems somewhat disingenuous at this juncture for Father to argue that 
the evidence was inadequate when the presentation of the evidence was within his 
control. Nevertheless, this argument is not supported by the record. Ms. Waldrop 
presented evidence as to the value of both motor vehicles (TR 30-31), and both 
parties presented evidence as to the debt owed on the Honda Odyssey (TR 31; 93). 
Father's second contention is that the parties' testimony disagreed as to 
whether the credit card arrearage was Father's fault or Mother's and that the trial 
court should not have relied on the testimony in either case because neither party 
presented any evidence as to the amount of the arrearage. On this issue, the trial 
court chose to believe Mother instead of Father, finding that Father's failure to 
make the ordered payments had created the arrearage. TR 214-215. This Court 
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should defer to the trial court on issues of credibility. D' Aston v. D' Aston, 844 
P.2d 345, 355 (Utah App. 1992.) 
In short, Father has not raised a viable challenge as to the correctness of the 
trial court's findings. Father's failure to marshal the evidence is fatal to his claim. 
Wilson Supply, at f 26. If an appellant fails to properly marshal the evidence, this 
Court must assume that the evidence supports the trial court's findings. Chen v. 
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, at f 80, 100 P.3d 1177 (citing Med. Prods Inc. v. Searcy, 958 
P.2d 228, 233 (Utah 1998)). 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion. 
Although Father's line of reasoning is truly in the nature of challenging the 
factual basis for the trial court's findings, the argument is couched as an attack on 
the trial court's discretion. This Court held just last month that "The trial court 
has broad latitude in such matters, and orders distributing property and setting 
alimony will not be lightly disturbed.'" Olsen v. Olsen, 2007 UT App 296, If 8, 
P.3d (quoting Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985)). 
The trial court is given similar autonomy in the area of child support. "In 
reviewing child . . . support proceedings, we accord substantial deference to the 
trial court's findings and give it considerable latitude in fashioning the appropriate 
relief." Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
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In the case at bar, the trial court declined to order repayment of the child 
support overages paid by Father for two reasons. First, the court found that Father 
had received a greater share of the parties' personal property, particularly given 
the value of the Honda Odyssey. As the Odyssey had a net worth of between 
$11,361 and $10,225 (depending on whose testimony the court accepted), it was 
not an abuse of discretion to conclude that such an award in Father's favor was an 
appropriate offset for a child support overpayment of $10,501.47. 
The court also found that the credit card arrearages that accrued during the 
three-year pendency of the case were a result of Father's failure to comply with 
the temporary order requiring him to make payments on the cards. It was not 
necessary for the court to find an exact amount of the arrearage that was so caused, 
particularly in light of the failure of either party to present evidence as to this 
factor. 
Either of these findings alone would have been adequate to support the 
court's conclusion that Father should not be repaid the child support overpayments. 
When taken together, the findings clearly establish that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion on this issue. 
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POINT III 
MOTHER SHOULD BE AWARDED FEES. 
Father challenged two portions of the trial court's decision, and neither 
challenge has merit. In part, Father's appeal is fatally deficient because of his own 
failure to marshal the evidence. Father's appeal may be boiled down to an 
assertion that the court did not believe his evidence, and the outcome was therefore 
unfair. 
While Mother acknowledges that the trial court did not award fees below, 
this Court retains the authority to award fees pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-3. "We 
may order either party to pay attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989), 
and this includes attorney fees incurred on appeal." Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 
P.2d 1057, 1061-62 (Utah App. 1990) (citations omitted). Mother's attorney has 
submitted a separate affidavit attesting that his services on Mother's appeal were 
largely rendered on credit because Mother did not have the ability to pay. The 
affidavit also attests to the reasonableness of the fees and costs. 
Due to professional courtesy, Mother's counsel would hesitate to denigrate 
an opposing party, but the issues raised in this appeal are utterly without merit and 
are borderline frivolous. It is unfair that Mother should be required to come up 
with thousands of dollars in attorney's fees merely because Father chose to appeal. 
If she had the money to afford such fees, the court may have directed her to repay 
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some of the child support overpayment. Considering all of these circumstances, it 
is reasonable that Father be ordered to pay Mother's attorney's fees and costs on 
appeal 
CONCLUSION 
Father has failed to marshal the evidence on either of the issues he has 
chosen to challenge. Further, the trial court's conclusions on both issues are 
articulated sufficiently for this Court to comprehend its reasoning and are well 
within its sound discretion. Therefore, this Court should affirm the judgment of 
the district court and award Mother the fees she incurred in defending this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \U> day of October, 2007. 
PAUL H. OLDS 
Attorney! for Petitioner/Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served the brief of the appellee herein upon the 
opposing party by placing two true and correct copies thereof in an envelope and 
causing the same to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, on the Ibth day of 
October, 2007, to the following: 
Philip C. Patterson 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant 
419 27th Street 
Ogden,UT 84401 
llMoSClabu Tj^yfyM 
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